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ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY AND
JUDICIAL RELIEF
Steven Goldman*
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The oppressor's wrong ... the law's delay.
Hamlet, Act III, s. I
I.

THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

agencies, created in part to provide simple,
speedy, and efficient procedures, have often been prone to
excessive delay in their proceedings.1 Lapses of time in administrative proceedings may occasion considerable individual and social
costs. Increased expenses may be a direct consequence of the delay,
as are lawyers' fees and executives' time, or may result indirectly
from factors such as the rising cost of necessary goods and services
during an inflationary period. In addition, lengthy administrative
proceedings may force abandonment of profitable projects or may
create such uncertainty as to the outcome of the proceedings that
the party's ability to plan is hampered and his credit position impaired. If the regulated party is a public corporation, even the market price of its stock may be affected by delay. The prospect of delay
may discourage desirable activity by stifling individual initiative or
may induce avoidance of the administrative process, thereby undermining its very raison d'etre. Finally, all of these difficulties are
compounded in the case of a small business that is unable to bear
the risk and uncertainty incident to delay.2
In many instances, however, the passage of time is a requisite to
the effective functioning of the administrative process. Time may be
necessary to build an adequate record, to pursue informal negotiations, to reach settlements in other related cases, or to insure the
parties a full and careful consideration of all the relevant issues.

A

DMINISTRATIVE

• Assistant Professor of Business Law, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce,
University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1964, Princeton University; LL.B. 1967, Harvard
University.-Ed.
1. See H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 68 (1967):
I wonder whether law students still are taught, as we were in the 1920's, to contrast the celerity of those Mercury-like and wing-footed messengers, the administrative agencies, with the creeping and cumbersome processes of the courts. If
they are, they have a rude awakening ahead, on both counts. To borrow Mr.
Churchill's phrase, the regulatory agencies often tolerate delays up with which
the judiciary would not put.
2. See Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down,
49 A.B.A.J. 833 (1963); Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The
Right to Relief From Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963).
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On the other hand, delay is frequently unrelated to the proper functioning of the administrative process. Causes for such delay include
crowded dockets, inadequate appropriations, lack of personnel,
indecision on major policies, tactical delays by opposing parties, and
unnecessary or repetitious procedures and hearings.
When parties suffer substantial harm from unwarranted administrative delay, they quite naturally turn to the courts for relief;
indeed, disinterested judicial scrutiny of administrative Ia-wmaking
is a useful and recognized component of our legal system. The function of the courts as second-line reviewing agencies is not logically
limited to reviewing administrative action as distinct from administrative inaction. The courts and administrative agencies share a concern for fashioning a legal system which is effective and responsive
to individual demands for an orderly and expeditious resolution of
issues. And, from the viewpoint of the private parties, the advantages of another potential avenue of relief are manifest: agencies
seldom have internal review boards for expediting action, and informal relief through political pressure-while available to economically or politically powerful groups-is not ·within the rea~h of the
average private party. Thus, judicial review of administrative delay
may open an alternative channel of relief to all parties, irrespective
of wealth and power.
The problem of judicial relief from protracted agency delay has
been virtually undiscussed in the existing literature. The few courts
that have dealt with the delay question have acted instinctively,
without providing any rational framework and without articulating
either relevant concerns or appropriate standards. This Article will
explore the range of issues raised when courts are called upon to
grant relief from excessive administrative delay.

II.

EFFECTIVE LIMITS oF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: Is ADMINISTRATIVE
DELAY JUSTICIABLE?

Although the above considerations may favor judicial intervention, considerations of judicial competence may limit the ability of
courts to resolve questions of administrative delay. A court may be
unable to obtain all of the information necessary for a reasoned
judgment, to evolve meaningful standards that will guide future
administrative conduct, or even to fashion an appropriate remedy.
In short, the question of administrative delay may be a "managerial"
question not soluble by generally applicable criteria of decision and
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therefore more suitable for legislative or administrative control than
for judicial supervision. The justiciability of the delay issue in varying contexts may be illustrated by several hypothetical cases.

Case I: Evenhandedness
In 1963, Pipeline Inc., a newly organized corporation, applied
for a commission certificate to construct and operate a pipeline.
The normal time necessary for the agency to dispose of pipeline
certification cases is three years. Five years have passed, and Pipeline
institutes suit in an appropriate court alleging that there is no substantial reason why its application should take longer than other
routine certification cases. Pipeline requests the court to compel the
agency either to expedite the proceedings or to show cause why a
certificate should not be issued.
The delay issue in this case seems to be justiciable. Since there is
proof of the normal time necessary to dispose of similar proceedings, the court has a ready-made standard for judgment. Assuming
that Pipeline is able to show that it is within the class that normally
receives certification in three years, the policy of evenhandednessthe notion that like cases should be treated alike-provides the
court with a familar and judicially manageable criterion for making a reasoned decision.3 Presumably, the court also would be able
to evaluate asserted administrative justifications for treating Pipeline differently. Moreover, unlike case III, discussed below, fashioning an appropriate remedy would not involve elaborate and timeconsuming proof of comparative harm to other applicants similarly
situated. If Pipeline is one of a very few applicants suffering from
five years' delay, the court might easily expedite its case without undue prejudice to other pending applications. But, if Pipeline is only
one of a large group of companies whose applications have been
pending for five years, the court might conclude that the time required for disposal of similar cases is not really three years but five.
Thus, the question of the propriety of judicial intervention may
well tum upon whether there has been excessive delay at all-an issue which a court is clearly competent to decide.

Case II: Bias
The same facts as in case I, but Pipeline alleges that its application has been pending for two years longer than the average bell. See, e.g., International Business Mach. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl.
1965).
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cause a commissioner has a personal grudge against the president of
Pipeline and has deliberately caused delay to force Pipeline out of
business.
The delay issue in this case is equally appropriate for adjudication. The standards employed in case I are available to guide
judicial judgment. And, the additional factor of bias provides the
court with a further ground for assessing whether the delay is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Courts have carefully scrutinized administrative action tainted with bias or prejudice, and
there seems to be no sound reason to distinguish those cases from an
instance in which bias causes agency inaction. Even if there were
legitimate reasons for denying Pipeline's application, there still
would be little justification for the commission to delay decision;
rather, the agency should issue a timely, outright denial, which
would be subject to disinterested judicial review. Finally, as in case
I, the appropriate remedy seems relatively easy to fashion.

Case III: Political Impotence
The same facts as in case I, but Pipeline claims that its application has been pending for five years because Major Inc., a giant in
the oil industry, has exerted its political and economic influence by
pressuring congressmen to expedite consideration of its own application.
Delay resulting from the political strength of other regulated
parties is a more troublesome issue for adjudication than is the delay
in either case I or II. On the one hand, the policy of evenhandedness provides the court with some standard for judgment. And
yet, perhaps a court should not attempt to redress the imbalance of
economic and political power where no otherwise improper conduct has been shown. It is well recognized that the administrative
process is not insulated from political forces, and it is at best doubtful whether a court can say that governmental regulation should be
responsive to some legitimate political forces but not to others.
Moreover, fashioning an appropriate remedy would be difficult in
this situation. Any equitable considerations that favor accelerating
Pipeline's application could also be urged on behalf of other applicants who have been forced to wait their turns while Major received preferred treatment. Thus, judicial relief for Pipeline alone
might be unfair to these other applicants, unless it can be proved
that Pipeline's case is different or that delay is more burdensome to
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Pipeline. Proof of these factors would vastly expand the scope of
judicial inquiry into issues more appropriate for resolution by the
agency docket clerk than by a court. Furthermore, the weighing of
relative harm suffered by various applicants might be not only judicially infeasible, but also seriously burdensome to the courts. The
court could avoid some of these difficulties by enjoining the agency
from expediting Major's case if it is not too late to do so. In effect,
Pipeline would be viewed as bringing a class action on behalf of all
similarly injured parties; but such an approach would still be open
to the objection that the court is interfering with the normal functioning of the political process and meddling in agency business.

Case IV: Agency Priority
The same facts as in case I, but Pipeline argues that its application has been pending for five years because the agency has determined that Major's application deserves priority over other applicants due to the importance of its proposed facilities.
As in the preceding case, Pipeline has been harmed not as a
single entity, but as a member of a class of applicants, all of whom
have been pushed back one place in line. Even if this procedural
objection could be obviated through the use of a class action, relief
exclusively for Pipeline would be unfair to similarly situated parties
and it seems doubtful that a court would be competent to resolve
the "managerial" problem of allocating priorities to limited agency
resources.4 It is even more doubtful that the court could make a
more informed decision than agency experts on the question of
whether the social benefits of accelerating Major's application outweigh the detriments. Nevertheless, the court appears competent to
exercise its normal limited review over agency action: to evaluate
the legal sufficiency of the commission's reasons and determine
whether the agency considered the proper factors in arriving at its
judgment. Therefore, if the issue was presented in timely proceedings and the court found that Major's application was advanced for
inadequate or unjustifiable reasons or without full consideration of
the relevant factors, it might remand to the agency for additional
findings or enjoin acceleration of Major's case.
4. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring): "Whether 'justiciability' exists . . • has most often
turned on evaluating both the appropriateness of issues for decision by courts and the
hardship of denying relief." See also note 58 infra.

1428

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:1423

Case V: Judicial Priority
In 1967, Major Inc., the oil industry giant, applied for a certificate to construct and operate a pipeline. The normal time necessary to dispose of pipeline certification cases is three years. One and
one-half years has elapsed, and Major institutes suit seeking judicial
acceleration of its application on the ground that its proposed facilities are important to the community and that it will have to
forgo the project entirely unless approval is forthcoming.
Despite the fact that Major might be able to achieve its objective through the political process5 or by agency action, 0 judicial
relief seems inappropriate in this context. Apart from the question
of whether the legislature intended the courts to intervene affirmatively in the administrative process, there are no meaningful standards which a court can use to determine whether Major's request
for priority is warranted. Even if the court were to decide that the
appropriate standard is "public interest," a comprehensive, comparative analysis of other matters pending on the commission's
docket would be required to determine if other applications were
of greater "public interest" or if the detriment to the public caused
by deferring other cases ounveighs the benefit from deciding Major's case immediately. Such a comparative determination would be
time consuming and would require judicial balancing of largely immeasurable factors. Moreover, even if courts were capable of balancing these factors, they lack the equipment for gathering the information needed to assess these complex economic issues. And,
more important, because of the numerous variables to be considered in determining priority benveen applicants, ad hoc administrative discretion seems more appropriate than judicial "reasoned
elaboration" since it is largely impossible to develop "generally applicable premises of reasoning with reference to which the variables
can be judged." 7
Other factors lead to the conclusion that the priority question
should not be justiciable in this context. Many applicants, as a matter of course, could apply to various courts for expediting orders.
Conceivably, an administrative agency would be subjected to many
conflicting court orders, resulting in a significant loss of agency control over the scheduling of its own docket, and making it impossible
5. Cf. Case III supra.
6. Cf. Case IV supra.
7. H. Hart &: A. Saks, THE LEGAL
APPLICATION OF LAW 669 (1968).

PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
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for the agency to comply with possibly inconsistent orders. If the
courts were required to consider other court orders establishing
priorities, there would be an unwarranted premium placed on the
diligence of applicants who rush to the courthouse first. This problem could probably be avoided by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over
priority cases in one court; but even if such an approach were
politically feasible, it seems doubtful that a special court would be
any better equipped to resolve the essentially "managerial" problems
inherent in supervision of an agency docket.

Case VI: Efficiency
The same facts as in case I, except that after one and one-half
years Pipeline institutes suit alleging that its case should be decided
immediately because there is no reason for certification proceedings
to take three years, and that if the agency were more efficient, certification decisions could be rendered in one and one-half years.
Unlike case V, where the applicant seeks priority over other
parties by asserting an affirmative justification, the court in this case
would not be required to undertake the difficult analysis of the competing claims of other applicants. Instead, since Pipeline's claim pertains to the efficient allocation of administrative resources as a whole,
the court must decide whether the commission is acting with appropriate dispatch in all of its certification cases. In most cases a court
would not be competent to make such a decision. While it might be
argued that a workable test could be based upon the normal time
required by this agency or other agencies to process similar cases, it
is unlikely that a court could evolve viable standards to determine
the appropriate length of time for any particular administrative
action. The court would have to work with a relative standard such
as "reasonable dispatch" rather than making an essentially legislative
judgment that a particular administrative practice should take no
longer than a specified period of time. However, a "reasonable dispatch" standard is not likely to be susceptible to reasoned elaboration: the large number of potentially relevant £actors and the difficulty of assessing the relative importance of each variable seem to
preclude effective adjudication. For example, to determine whether
three years constitutes "reasonable dispatch" for pipeline certification proceedings, it may be necessary to examine the nature of the
proceedings required by statute, the complexity of the substantive
issues, the relative importance of pipeline certification matters to
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other kinds of pending cases, the amount and quality of agency resources, and so forth. These factors are largely immeasurable, and
their relative importance varies considerably over time because of
the dynamic nature of the administrative process. Moreover, some
of these factors-such as the relative importance of different types
of agency actions-require an initial policy determination that is
clearly nonjudicial in nature. Finally, the stare decisis effect of such
a decision would be minimal. Considerable relitigation of the same
issue under changing circumstances would be likely; and, as a matter
of policy, there is serious question whether limited judicial resources should be allocated to making such ephemeral decisions.
The difficulty of acquiring enough evidence to formulate a reasoned judgment also leads to the conclusion that the delay issue is
not justiciable when it turns on questions of administrative efficiency. Since independent judicial research is generally impractical,
the court would be forced to rely upon those few factors which may
be considered by judicial notice and on evidence gathered by the
parties to the proceeding. To be sure, most of the relevant information would be in the hands of the agency. However, a rule of evidence requiring the agency to come fonvard with all the information justifying the length of its proceedings still would not suffice to
provide the court with information about dilatory behavior or administrative inefficiency. And, it is certainly not clear that the court
could require an agency to come forward with evidence proving
the applicant's case as well. Perhaps discovery procedures would
provide the applicant and the court with the relevant facts relating
to administrative inefficiency. However, discovery would seem to be
an inadequate tool unless the agency had compiled the relevant records and comparative time charts.8 Finally, the courts' ability to
fashion an appropriate remedy is also open to serious question
when administrative delay is caused by inefficiency. If delay results
from inadequate appropriations, lack of personnel, or incompetence, the remedy seems to lie with the legislature and not with the
courts.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, some challenges to
administrative inefficiency should be justiciable. For example, if an
agency holds repetitive hearings, the delay issue is susceptible of ad8. Even though many courts possess broad discovery powers, the time and expense
burden of searching an agency's records could still defeat the plaintiff's case. More.over, there appears to be inherent danger in opening agency files when competitors
in the same industry have cases pending before the agency.
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judication. The standard of "reasonable dispatch" is judicially
manageable in this context: the court can determine whether the
asserted benefits derived from additional hearings outweigh the potential harm that the delay would inflict upon the party before the
agency. In this situation the court is not faced with a difficult inquiry into how agency resources should be allocated among competing activities; instead, agency resources may be freed from useless activity and put to more productive use. Furthermore, the
information needed to weigh the asserted benefits and detriments
would be readily accessible in the record of the agency proceedings,
the asserted administrative justification for additional hearings, and
the complaint alleging the harm suffered by the party before the
agency. Finally, a court would be able to grant an appropriate remedy by enjoining the repetitious proceedings.
As the foregoing hypotheticals indicate, most cases fall between
the polar extremes of complaints about useless hearings and general
allegations of administrative inefficiency. In each such instance, the
institutional competence of the court to adjudicate the delay issue
depends upon a range of considerations including the nature and
cause of the delay, the existence of ascertainable and judicially manageable standards, the availability of information needed to decide
the case, and the possibility of fashioning an effective remedy. If an
analysis based upon these considerations leads to the conclusion that
a given case is within the court's sphere of competence, the prospective plaintiff must then construct an appropriate theory of relief.

III.

EQUITABLE RELIEF: PREREQUISITES AND THEORIES

A. Prerequisites for Relief
When a party suffers from agency delay, the cases indicate that
he will probably seek some form of equitable relief. 9 If a court is
to grant an injunction against agency delay, according to traditional
theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has no adequate legal
remedy and that he is suffering irreparable harm10 because of the delay. An example of such a showing is American Broadcasting Co. v.
9. A writ of mandamus, though technically a legal remedy [Stern v. South Chester
Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968) (dictum)], is "largely controlled by equitable principles."
Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U.S. 308, 311 (1917). The federal district courts are
empowered to issue writs "in the nature of mandamus" against "an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff,"
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), although the writ itself no longer exists as a "writ of mandamus." FED. R. CIV. P. 8l(b).
10. See pages 1450-52 infra.
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Federal Communications Commission,11 where the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) successfully contended that agency inaction
had nullified substantially its rights under the Federal Communications Act. The controversy first arose in 1941, when the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) temporarily assigned radio station KOB to a frequency of 770 cycles. WJZ, which operated on
that frequency, protested, but the war intervened and WJZ did not
press its objections. However, in 1944 KOB requested a permanent
license for 770 cycles, and WJZ's motion requesting dismissal of the
KOB application was denied. In August 1946 the FCC announced
that it would not evaluate clear channel applications until the completion of a clear channel investigation then being conducted by the
agency, and that it would extend KOB's special service authorization to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of the clear
channel proceedings. Ten years after the first temporary, six-month
license was issued, and after successive issuances of similar six-month
licenses, both KOB and WJZ appealed from a further extension of
KOB's special service authorization on the ground that these successive renewals had changed a temporary order into a permanent
one. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that since there was no showing that the clear channel investigation
would be completed in the near future, the FCC could not maintain
the status quo indefinitely by arguing that the ultimate determination of KOB's status depended upon the outcome of the investigation:
WJZ has thus been required to bear a large part of the loss . . . .
The Commission has in effect permitted this substantial loss to
occur and to continue.
. . . [C]ourts must act to make certain that what can be done is
done. Agency inaction can be as harmful as wrong action. The Commission cannot, by its delay, substantially nullify rights which the
Act confers ... .
We cannot . . . determine the ultimate disposition . . . of the
. . . controversy . . . . But we can provide "a remedy against inaction" . . . .
. . . If appropriate proceedings are promptly begun and expeditiously carried forward ... the Commission ... [may] preserve the
status quo for such reasonable period as may be necessary to make
"a valid determination * * * with all deliberate speed." 12

The delay causing irreparable harm to the party before the
agency may take several forms. For example, in Application of Trico
11. 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
12. 191 F.2d at 501-02.

May 1968]

Administrative Delay

1433

Electric Cooperative, Inc. 13 the Arizona supreme court held that
the serious financial loss that Trico was suffering because of delay
was sufficient ground for compelling the state corporation commission either to approve a contract or to show cause why it would not
assent. Irreparable harm may also result from administrative delay
in failing to proceed against other similarly situated parties. In
C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 14 the agency proceeded against only one of nineteen competitors, all of whom allegedly engaged in the same illegal pricing practices. It appeared
that if only Niehoff was enjoined, it would be forced out of business. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suspended
enforcement against Niehoff until similar orders were entered
against Niehoff's competitors in order to achieve equal treatment of
like-situated parties. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed,
however, holding that the timing of orders was "peculiarly within
the expert understanding of the Commission."15 Unequal timing of
related orders may be another cause of irreparable harm. In Atlantic
Seaboard Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,16 the agency suspended rate increases of Atlantic Seaboard, its supplier, and its supplier's supplier for a period of six months. However, Atlantic Seaboard's six-month suspension period began and ended twenty-two
days later than that of its supplier. As a result, Atlantic Seaboard
would have had to pay substantially higher prices to its supplier for
twenty-two days before its own rates could have been increased. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in effect eliminated this timing problem by making· the six-month suspension period for all parties coincide.
Other policies, however, might outweigh a party's showing of
irreparable harm and result in denial of relief from protracted agency
delay. For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 11
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside
a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cease and desist order on the
grounds that the order was not supported by substantial evidence and
that one member of the FTC was disqualified from participating in
the case. The court concluded that the normal procedure of remand
was inappropriate because of inordinate delays throughout the litigation, and ordered the complaint dismissed. This order was vacated
13. 92 Ariz. 373, 377 P .2d 309 (1962).
14. 241 F.2d 37, 41-43 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd sub. nom. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC,
355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958).
15. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958).
16. 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953).
17. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
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by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the FTC for
further action. The Court concluded that the proceedings against
Texaco ought not to be terminated, because to do so would subordinate the public interest in effective competition to Texaco's interest
in speedy adjudication.18
B. Theories of Relief

I. Constitutional Arguments
Judical relief from protracted administrative delay was first given
during the period when federal courts exercised close constitutional
supervision over the rate-making decisions of public utility commissions. In one of the few cases dealing with agency delay, Smith
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,19 Illinois Bell successfully argued that
a state commerce commission's delay unconstitutionally deprived it
of property without due process of law. In July of 1919 Illinois
Bell filed a schedule of rates that were to become effective on May 1,
1920. The commission repeatedly suspended the effective date of the
rate increase, and in the latter part of 1921 it entered an order permanently suspending the rate increase. In April 1922, a state court
reversed the commission order and remanded the case for further
hearings. The commission held new hearings, but made no final determination. Illinois Bell then filed a motion requesting that the
commission approve a temporary schedule of rates pending its final
determination. This motion was ignored. Finally, in June of 1924,
Illinois Bell successfully requested a federal court to enjoin the
commission from enforcing the original schedule of rates, which it
alleged to be confiscatory. In affirming the grant of the injunction
the Supreme Court stated:
Property may be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by an
express affirmance of them .... [T]he injured public service company
is not required indefinitely to await a decision of the rate-making
tribunal before applying to a federal court for equitable relief. 20

When the confiscatory results of the delay are not as readily apparent as they were in the rate regulation cases, however, constitutional objections to administrative delay generally have been unsuc18. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
19. 270 U.S. 587 (1926); see also Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp., 268 U.S. 413 (1925);
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923); Prendergast v. New York
Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923).
20. 270 U.S. at 591-92.
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cessful. For example, in Berkshire Employees Ass'n of Berkshire
Knitting Mills v. NLRB 21 the employer requested that a National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) order be set aside on the ground
that the NLRB's delay in issuing a complaint constituted a denial
of due process. The evidence indicated that the issuance of the complaint had been postponed at the request of union officials in order
to further their strategy at the bargaining table. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that agency delay in filing the complaint did not constitute a denial of due process:
The matter of time ·with regard to the issuance of a complaint by an
administrative body must necessarily be one of the matters within
the discretion of that body. Numerous considerations may make
it desirable that a complaint be issued promptly or be delayed,
for example, pending a court decision, or the likelihood of settlement of a dispute by other means; these and others are matters in
which the judgment of the administrative agency must be exercised.
w·e do not find lack of due process of law in the fact of delay ....22

Although an agency has broad discretion in controlling its procedures, it seems clear that the Constitution provides some limitations on protracted administrative delay. The Illinois Bell case indicates the limitation imposed by the due process clause on dilatory
behavior, and arbitrary or capricious administrative behavior may
also raise equal protection questions, as, for example, where an
agency systematically discriminates against Negro applicants by deliberately employing dilatory tactics against them. Such discriminatory behavior could certainly be condemned as a denial of equal
protection if the administrative body in question were a state agency.
And, even though the equal protection clause does not by its terms
apply to the federal government, overt racial discrimination by a
federal agency would probably violate concepts of fairness inherent
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 23 The harder case,
21. 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941).
22. 121 F.2d at 237.
23. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) [footnote omitted]:
The Fifth Amendment ••• does not contain an equal protection clause as does
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as
this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 584-85 (1937); Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REv.
362 (1952).
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however, is like case I, above, in which there is no affirmative evidence of discrimination other than the fact that similar proceedings
are normally disposed of within a much shorter period of time.
There is certainly a prima facie violation of the policy of evenhandedness. Assuming that the agency cannot iustify the delay, it
seems that the spirit of the equal protection clause has been frustrated by such differential treatment. However, it could be argued
that the court should avoid the constitutional issue by relying on
some other theory of relief. 24
An analog-ous use of specific constitutional provisions to control
delay can be found in several recent cases. In the free speech area,
for example, prior restraint of motion pictures is permissible only
if the censoring body either issues a license or seeks judicial prohibition within a "specified brief period" of time. 25 Similarly, the seizure
of allegedly obscene books may be invalidated if governmental delay
has suppressed the books for an unduly protracted period. 26
First amendment concerns for "chilling" free speech were combined with the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial to strike
down dilatory governmental proceedings in Klobfer v. North Carolina.21 The delay in this case resulted from North Carolina's statutory
nolle prosequi procedure which allowed the state to hold Klooferover his objection-subject to trial for an unlimited period. During
this time, the solicitor could restore the case to the calendar, but
Klopfer could neither obtain a dismissal nor have the case restored
to the calendar for trial. Klopfer had been indicted for criminal trespass following a civil rights demonstration in February 1964, and
prosecution be~n in March 1964. When the jury failed to reach a
verdict, the judge declared a mistrial and ordered the case continued
24. See Tustice Brandeis' famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936), for an extensive discussion of the Court's practice of avoiding
constitutional issues.
25. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). See also Teitel Film Corp. v.
Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
26. United States v. One Book Entitled "The Adventures of Father Silas," 249 F.
Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Cf. United States v. Reliable Sales Co., 376 F.2d 803, 805
(4th Cir. 1967), in which the court held that during the government's appeal only a
small proportion of allegedly obscene books could be retained in custody in order to
prevent the case from becoming moot:
fWlhile the cases deal principally with administrative <lelav which invalidates
prior submission processes of censorship, the Court in Freedman specified the
safeguards necessary to make the process constitutional as follows: (I) the burden
of proof must rest on the censor; (2) no valid final restraint may be imposed except bv judicial determination, and any restraint prior to such determination must
be designed to preserve the status quo; and (3) a prompt judicial determination
must be assured. [Emphasis in original].
Zl. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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for the term. Before the April 1965 term, the solicitor prevailed on a
motion to continue the case for another term. When Klopfer's case
was not listed for trial in the August 1965 term, he filed a motion expressing his desire to have the case pending against him concluded
"as soon as reasonably possible" because the pending indictment
interfered with his activities as a private citizen. The solicitor moved
successfully for a nolle prosequi with leave, which allowed him to
restore the case to trial at any future date. The Supreme Court, holding that this procedure denied Klopfer his right to a speedy trial,
stated:
The pendency of the indictment may subject him to public scorn and
deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular
causes. By indefinitely prolonging this oppression, as well as the
"anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation," the criminal
procedure ... denies the petitioner the right to a speedy trial ....28

Although the sixth amendment confines the right to a speedy
trial exclusively to criminal prosecutions, it is not inconceivable that
this right might extend to administrative proceedings which require
a subsequent criminal prosecution and perhaps even to agency disciplinary hearings of a quasi-criminal nature. In instances where
the agency must institute criminal proceedings for a willful violation
of its rules, it is arguable that undue delay in seeking a court determination of guilt or innocence deprives the party before the agency
of his right to a speedy trial. Although there is no indictment against
such a party, the pending agency proceedings may subject the party
to public scorn and have a "chilling effect" on his associational
rights. And, if there is no statute of limitations prescribing the time
within which the agency must come to court, the party before the
agency would be subject to trial for an unlimited period during which
he would have no means of securing a dismissal or of obtaining an
adjudication on the merits. Such a situation might well constitute
an infringement of the right to speedy trial, although a court might
prefer to apply a nonconstitutional theory of relief such as !aches. On
the other hand, the foregoing analysis probably would not apply
if there is an applicable statute of limitations, since the legislature
has dra-wn a line between timely and tardy institution of suits.29 Yet,
28. 386 U.S. at 222.
29. It could be argued that the applicable statute of limitations is not the sole
criterion for determining what is a "reasonable" period within which to institute suit,
since a statute of limitations does not address itself to the question of whether or not
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even if a "timely" suit were instituted, seriously dilatory behavior
in prosecuting the action might also result in the denial of the party's
sixth amendment rights.
When the agency is not required to seek enforcement in court,
but rather is permitted by statute to impose a penalty itself, it might
be contended that undue delay in the agency proceedings deprives
the party before the agency of his right to a speedy trial. Such a
contention could be based upon the due process clause as well as on
the sixth amendment. If due process requires a "trial-type hearing," 30
a speedy trial might be considered an integral part of the hearing
requirement. It could also be argued, more broadly, that the right
to speedy proceedings is implicit in the motion of fundamental fairness and orderly justice guaranteed by the due process clause.
Apart from the due process clause, it might also be contended
that the speedy trial guarantee applies to quasi-criminal administrative prosecutions. Although the sixth amendment guarantee of a
speedy trial may be narrowly construed to apply only to orthodox
"criminal prosecutions," 31 there is no apparent policy reason why it
should be; quasi-criminal administrative prosecutions may involve
the same element of public accusation as criminal prosecutions, and
the party can be harmed just as much by the delay. However, two
textual arguments seem to compel the conclusion that the speedy
trial guarantee is not applicable to this class of administrative proceedings. The language of the sixth amendment-"right to a speedy
... trial, by an impartial jury"-appears to bind the speedy trial
guarantee to a proceeding in which there is a right to a jury. Since
a party before an administrative agency clearly has no right to a
jury, it would seem that the sixth amendment guarantee does not
extend to quasi-criminal administrative proceedings. There is no
the suit is brought as soon as is reasonably possible. For an example of this kind of
analysis in the context of a criminal prosecution, see Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d
210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
30. 'Whether or not due process requires a trial-type hearing is of course a complex
issue. The requirement varies with the nature of the administrative process applied,
the kind of issue being determined, and other factors. "Due process" may not include
all the elements of a common-law trial in particular types of proceedings. Compare
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bimetallic Investment Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See generally Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d
265 (4th Cir. 1965).
31. See, e.g., Farmers' Livestock Comm'n Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 375, 378
(E.D. Ill. 1931) (the withdrawal or suspension of a license, upon an administrative
finding that a condition imposed in granting the license has not been observed, does
not constitute a "criminal prosecution").
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reason why the right to a speedy trial need be limited exclusively to
proceedings where there is a right to a jury; yet the plain words of
the sixth amendment strongly suggest that the guarantee is so
limited. Moreover, even if the "speedy trial" guarantee were severable from proceedings requiring a jury, the word "trial" undoubtedly refers to an orthodox criminal trial. It would clearly expand
the traditional meaning of the word "trial" to incorporate within it
administrative prosecutorial proceedings. Finally, as a practical matter, a court presumabaly would be reluctant to stretch the seemingly
clear language of the sixth amendment when the due process clause
might be used to grant the requested relief.

2.

The Administrative Procedure Act

Another doctrinal basis for obtaining relief from the delay of a
federal agency may be found in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).32 Prior to the APA's recent revision, 33 section 6(a) provided
that "every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude
any manner presented to it .... " 34 This section was complemented
by section IO(e)(A), which directed the reviewing court to "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 35 The
courts, however, appear to have been reluctant to rely upon these
sections as grounds for remedying agency delay.
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan,36 in which a stevedoring company sought to require a deputy commissioner to render
a decision in a matter properly before him under the Longshoreman's
Compensation Act, seems to have been the first case to indicate-at
least in dictum-that both of these provisions of the APA could be
enforced by a mandatory injunction:
The APA provides categorically that "every agency shall proceed
with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it" ....
Apparently in recognition that a failure or refusal to hear and decide
could be as destructive as bad deciding, Congress provided in §IO(e)
that courts may review the inaction of an agency and specifically
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" ... and enforcement may be by a mandatory injunction.37
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

5 u.s.c. §§ 551-59 (1967).
80 Stat. 393 (1966).
60 Stat. 240 (1946).
60 Stat. 243 (1946).
374 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960).
374 F.2d at 802.

1440

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:1423

The first case to hold that the "reasonable dispatch" requirement
of section 6(a) gives rise to a legally enforceable right was Deering
Milliken, Inc. v. ]ohnston. 38 The case arose out of NLRB hearings
in 1957 dealing with the charge that Darlington Manufacturing Company had engaged in an unfair labor practice. At these hearings the
union sought to introduce evidence to establish that Darlington was
controlled by Deering Milliken in order to hold Deering responsible
for Darlington's acts. The trial examiner rejected this evidence as
being outside the scope of the complaint. When the NLRB reviewed
the examiner's findings, however, it remanded the case so that evidence could be introduced on the question of control. The hearing
after remand took ten months. More than a year after this hearing
was completed, the trial examiner submitted a report to the NLRB
which rejected the union's claim of single employer status between
the two companies. In 1961, three years after the first remand order,
the case again came before the NLRB and was remanded not only
for a hearing on newly discovered evidence, but also for a rehearing
of the entire single employer issue. At this point Deering sued to
enjoin the remand for additional hearings, asserting that the NLRB's
action constituted unreasonable delay in violation of section 6(a) of
the APA. The district court found that the hearings were repetitive
and granted the injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted this finding and concluded that Deering had a right to
be free from supplemental hearings which were repetitive, purposeless, and oppressive. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit modified the
injunction to allow further hearings only on the newly discovered
evidence.
Other petitioners, however, have been less successful in seeking
injunctions against remands for additional hearings. In Federal Trade
Commission v. ]. Weingarten, Inc., 39 Weingarten contended that an
FTC order to remand to a trial examiner for additional hearings
after nearly three years of formal proceedings violated the command
of section 6(a). The district court held that the remand was a violation of the APA and ordered the FTC to make a final disposition
of the matter within thirty days. However, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed:
Absent proof of the normal time necessary to dispose of a similar
proceeding or of facts tending to show a dilatory attitude on the
part of the Commission or its staff . . . we are unable to say that
38. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
39. 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964).
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a Judge can so hold.... [W]e think it would be the extremely rare
case where a Court would be justified in holding ... that the passage of time and nothing more presents an occasion for peremptory
intervention of an outside Court in the conduct of an agency's adjudicative proceedings.40
Judicial relief has also been withheld when the injured party has
not first sought acceleration of the action within the agency. This
requirement is apparently a form of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. For example, in M. G. Davis & Co. v.
Cohen,41 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted
a proceeding to revoke a broker-dealer registration. Two years had
elapsed since the issuance of the SEC complaint and the SEC had
done nothing more than appoint a hearing officer to rule on pretrial matters. Davis sued for an injunction restraining the SEC from
continuing its proceedings but the court refused to grant any relief,
indicating that a complaint for failure to proceed with reasonable
dispatch must first be made to the agency, regardless of whether the
delay was justified. The court also observed that the proper remedy
for unwarranted delay is a court order to expedite the proceeding,
not a decree terminating it altogether. This judicially imposed requirement of prior demand seems eminently sensible. Such a requirement gives the agency a last opportunity to alleviate the delay.
Moreover, this practice may facilitate the desirable development of
internal review boards with authority to rule on the question of
agency delay.
The recent revision of the entire APA42 does not appear to alter
the preceding case law significantly. The "reasonable dispatch"
language of section 6(a) has been replaced by a "reasonable time"
standard. Section 555(b) of the current APA provides that "[w]ith
due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their
representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it." 43 It does not seem likely
that Congress intended to dilute its statutory command by deleting
"reasonable dispatch" and substituting "reasonable time" as a standard. The word "dispatch" arguably conveys a tone of haste not
connoted by the "reasonable time" language. Nevertheless, the language of old section IO(e)(A), providing that the reviewing court
40. 336 F.2d at 691-92.
41. 256 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); accord, Gearhart &: Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d
798 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
42. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1967) (emphasis added).
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shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed," has been re-enacted verbatim in the new statute.44 Retention of this language suggests that courts should use the same standards to review protracted administrative delay under the new APA
as they did under the old. Indeed, despite the changed language, the
legislative history of the new APA arguably indicates that the courts
may have a somewhat expanded role in policing protracted administrative delay. In adopting the new APA, Congress rejected a proposed alternative draft of the new section 6(a). The proposal, Senate
Bill 1879, provided:
Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude
any matter presented to it . . . . Upon application made to any
Federal Court of competent jurisdiction by a party to any agency
proceeding or by a person adversely affected by agency action, and
a showing that there has been undue delay in connection with such
proceeding or action, the court may direct the agency to decide the
matter promptly. In any such case the agency may show that the
delay was necessary and unavoidable.45
Although the legislative history appears to be silent as to why this
alternative was rejected, deficiencies in the text itself provide a sufficient answer. There is a substantial risk that the statute could be read
narrowly to limit judicial relief solely to "directing the agency to
decide the matter promptly." Such a limitation would have hampered
reasonable judicial experimentation with alternative remedies. Moreover, the affirmative defense granted to the agency-that the delay
was "necessary and unavoidable"-might have been construed to
preclude other equally valid defenses, such as an assertion that the
delay was caused by the party before the agency.
Apart from the Senate bill's textual inadequacies, Congress may
have had a more significant reason for rejecting the alternative construction: a desire to frame a broad statutory standard which would
allow the courts to fill the interstices. If this was the intent of Congress, courts might begin to play a more active and creative role in
granting relief from protracted administrative delay under the new
APA.
3. Abridgement of Review
It may be argued that administrative delay also abridges the
right of appeal or the statutory right to judicial review. In Latvian
44. 5 u.s.c. § 706(1).
45. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966).
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State Cargo b Passenger Steamship Line v. United States, 46 the plaintiff sued to recover compensation for the taking of a ship which had
been requisitioned nearly eight years earlier. During this period the
Maritime Commission had failed to make any award or to take any
action whatsoever. The Court of Claims reasoned that the mvner of
requisitioned property has a right to appeal to a court after an
administrative determination of the issue of just compensation. This
right, the court maintained, could not be taken away by refusal of
the agency to act or by its unreasonable delay in acting.
This theory of abridgement of review seems to be more ·than a
circuitous assertion that administrative delay is reviewable: in effect
it assumes a right to prompt judicial review instead of a right to
speedy administrative action. Moreover, this theory seems to prove
too much. To be sure, protracted delay may postpone judicial review on the merits. But other administrative activity may also preclude judicial review. Informal settlements generally are not subject
to judicial scrutiny; to argue that informal settlements should be
subject to judicial review because they preclude judicial review
would be absurd. Admittedly the abridgement of review theory has
more plausibility in the context of administrative delay than it does
when applied to informal settlements, partially because informal
settlements are consensual and thus may give rise to a presumption
that the parties agreed to forgo judicial review. Yet the abridgement
theory on its face does not purport to distinguish between consensual
and nonconsensual administrative activity, and absent such subtle
distinctions, it seems that the theory does prove too much.
4. Divestment of Agency Jurisdiction

Another theory of relief, which is based on the proposition that an
agency may divest itself of jurisdiction through unreasonable delay,
seems to have more merit than the abridgement theory, at least when
applied to an agency's prosecutorial functions. 47 If the agency proceeds against a party within the time prescribed by the applicable
statute of limitations and then acts at an unreasonbly leisurely pace,
it may be contended that a court should treat the case as one in which
the agency never instituted proceedings at all. 48 However, the divest46. 88 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
47. For an example of an unsuccessful attempt to use the divestment theory, see
Louisville &: Nashville R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel &: Iron Co., 269 U.S. 217 (1925).
48. When there is no applicable statute of limitations, the divestment of jurisdic•
tion theory may become a variant of the doctrine of !aches.
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ment of jurisdiction theory should not be applied mechanically to
preclude desirable administrative action. Although a party has an
interest in speedy adjudication, countervailing considerations49 may
justify retention of jurisdiction by the agency in spite of the delay.
But the logic of the divestment of jurisdiction theory compels outright dismissal rather than judicial acceleration of the administrative proceeding or some lesser remedy; hence, its utility is limited
whenever there are countervailing factors that would justify a less
harsh remedy.

5. Laches
The use of the defense of !aches, based upon an agency's delay in
instituting suit, would be precluded in the majority of states and in
the federal courts by the rule that !aches is inapplicable to a suit by
government to enforce a public right. 50 An example of the minority
rule allowing !aches to be asserted in this situation is Schireson v.
Shafer, 51 in which Schireson received a citation in 1944 to appear before the state licensing board to answer charges that he obtained his
medical license by fraud in 1910. He sued to enjoin the board from
holding the hearing, alleging, inter alia, that !aches precluded revocation of the license. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
!aches issue could not be resolved until after a hearing on the merits
to determine if Dr. Schireson had been prejudiced by the delay.
IV.

OTHER POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Once the potential litigant establishes that the particular delay
issue is justiciable and adopts one or more of the above theories of
relief, he may have to face the doctrines of exhaustion, ripeness,
and finality. Judicial review of administrative delay does not invariably involve these problems. For example, if judicial relief is
sought to compel an agency to assume initial jurisdiction or to set
aside or modify a final order because of protracted delay, these doctrines are inapplicable. But when suit is brought to secure relief from
delay during the course of the administrative process, the doctrines
of exhaustion, ripeness, and finality may come into play. These overlapping concepts, unlike justiciability, deal with an issue of tim49. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
50. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Pennsalt Chems. Corp., 262 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Sears v. Treasurer &: Receiver
Gen., 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621 (1951).
51. 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946).
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ing-whether the party has come to court prematurely-and not
with the ultimate question of whether the substantive issue is appropriate for judicial decision at all.
A. Exhaustion

Normally, judicial relief is unavailable until the appropriate administrative remedies have been exhausted. A variety of policy reasons have been advanced in support of this rule. Primary among
them is the consideration of economy, since inconvenience and delay
normally result when agency proceedings are disrupted. In addition,
judicial intervention may alter the proper relationship of the courts
to the administrative process, negate the value of informed agency
discretion, and overburden the courts. But these considerations have
little force when, by hypothesis, the administrative process has become inert: rather than creating inconvenience or delay, court intervention seeks to remedy agency inaction. It may be true that an
agency is better equipped than a court to determine the appropriate
priority of its cases or the reasonable pace of its action, and that
such discretion is essential to give necessary flexibility to the agency
in dealing with a crowded docket; but, once a court has determined
that the particular delay issue is justiciable, these considerations
should be relevant only to the scope of review, and not to its availability. 52 Finally, the possibility of overburdening the courts53-if
it is not exaggerated-may be a price which must be paid for necessary policing of the administrative process. The floodgates may be
partially closed by creating a strong presumption in favor of the
agency in order to discourage frivolous suits.54
Even if there are some residual policy reasons for applying the
exhaustion rule in the context of administrative delay, it has never
been contended that exhaustion is an essential prerequisite to judicial
review. 515 The policies which favor requiring exhaustion must be
balanced against the injury to the party which would result from
denial of relief. If the potential litigant would suffer irreparable injury, there may be no need to exhaust administrative remedies. 56
52. See Recent Case, Administrative Law-Right to Expeditious Hearing-District
Court May Enjoin Implementation of NLRB Remand Order Where Unreasonable
Delay Would Result, 76 HARv. L. R.Ev. 401, 404 (1962).
53. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-26 (1965).
54. See Recent Case, supra note 44, at 404 (1962).
55. See K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 370-71 (1959).
56. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942);
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953).
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Moreover, there is a well-defined exception to the exhaustion rule if
the administrative remedy is inadequate or unavailable. 57 Consequently, when the administrative process is in a state of suspended
animation, and the agency provides no mechanism for reviewing its
own delay, the exhaustion rule seems inapplicable.
B. Ripeness
While the exhaustion rule guards against unnecessary or inappropriate short-circuiting of the administrative process, the ripeness doctrine is concerned with whether the issue before the court has matured sufficiently to be a "controversy." The crucial considerations
in deciding whether an issue is ripe for adjudication are the clarity
of the issues to be determined and the hardship of denying relief to
the party before the agency. 58 Protracted administrative delay, like
reapportionment, is an issue which does not seem to become more
concrete with the passage of time. Thus, once a court decides that
the particular delay issue is justiciable, the ripeness doctrine should
be inapplicable. Although it is possible that parties will seek judicial relief before the delay has become unreasonable, in these circumstances the court should dismiss the case on the merits, rather
than for lack of ripeness. And if the party before the agency has
been harmed irreparably by protracted delay, this injury may ipso
facto imply reviewability. 59 Therefore, the ripeness doctrine does not
seem to be a barrier to judicial review of administrative delay.

C. Finality
The rule that only final orders are subject to judicial review is
based upon considerations of administrative and judicial economy.
57. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961); Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1960); Southeastern Oil Florida,
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 198 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United
States, 88 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1950). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-26 (1965); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.07
(1958); Davis, Administrative Remedies Often Need Not Be Exhausted, 19 F.R.D. 437,
476 (1956).
58. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (footnote omitted):
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair
to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance or pre•
mature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference
until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect,
requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
See also Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet
Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967).
59. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
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Review of intermediate orders interrupts and prolongs the administrative process while affording parties an opportunity for constant
delays. Moreover, an intermediate order may become moot if the
party who was prejudiced by it obtains a favorable final decision. In
such circumstances interim judicial review would be unnecessary.
Neither of the policy reasons underlying the finality rule appears
to be applicable in the case of protracted delay. When the administrative process is at a standstill, judicial review will not interrupt
agency proceedings. 6° Furthermore, since delay may be prejudicial
despite the ultimate outcome on the merits, there is less likelihood
that interim judicial relief will prove to have been unnecessary.
This conclusion is supported by Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 61 in which the Fourth Circuit found that unreasonable delay by
its very nature constitutes "final agency action" within the meaning
of the APA: 62
Delay, so long as it continues and so long as there is any vestige of
a right which will suffer further impairment by an extension of the
delay, may not be final in the usual sense of that word, but when it
amounts to a violation of § 6(a) [reasonable dispatch] ... and to a
legal wrong within § IO(a) of that Act, it is final within the meaning
of§ IO(c).6 3
Such a construction clearly seems to implement the legislative mandate of section IO(e)(A), which authorizes the reviewing court to
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." And, because the reasons for the final order rule do not
seem to apply when the issue before the court is protracted administrative delay, it appears that the doctrine of finality, like ripeness
and exhaustion, should not be a bar to judicial relief.

V.

THE DELAY ISSUE ON THE MERITS:

A

SUGGESTED .APPROACH

After the party has surmounted the foregoing obstacles to court
review and has set forth a tenable theory of relief, he must prove the
issue of delay on the merits. Since the delay problem might arise in
an indefinite number of factual settings, the following analysis is
suggestive rather than exhaustive. In any case in which the delay
issue is presented, a court must ask at least three question: Is there
60. Although party exploitation of interim review as a dilatory tactic is unlikely
where agency delay is the issue for review, interim review might divert some agency
resources, thereby creating increased delay.
61. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
62. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
63. 295 F .2d at 865.
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delay at all? Is the delay unreasonable? And, even if the delay is
unreasonable, are there countervailing policies which preclude relief? Each of these questions will be examined in turn.

A. Is There Delay at All?
There are no absolute standards for distinguishing agency delay
from the normal or necessary passage of time. Nevertheless, certain
factors seem relevant to the determination of whether a particular
party has suffered from agency delay. The progress of the proceeding
may be compared to the rate experienced in cases of the same kind; 64
it would be a prima fade indication of delay if more time has elapsed
than the normal time necessary to dispose of similar proceedings. In
addition, the existence of unnecessary administrative activity or
other dilatory behavior or attitudes may be indicative of protracted
delay.
If the party before the agency comes to court prematurely, judicial relief will be unavailable, since, by hypothesis, there will have
been no unreasonable delay. However, the same party can return to
court later with identical contentions and the court will be forced to
make a de nova determination of the delay issue, since the principle
of res judicata will not serve as a bar to the action. This result is extremely desirable to the party before the agency. However, the result
is unfortunate from the standpoint of administrative and judicial
economy. The agency and the court must expend valuable resources
in defending and disposing of repetitious suits. In addition, the potential for harassment inherent in this situation might lead an agency
to favor the more litigious party in its scheduling. Nevertheless, a
party before the agency should not be limited to a single try in court.
A good faith mistake ought not to preclude judicial relief permanently. Instead, something more than mere delay ought to be required in the second suit; perhaps the court might require a showing
that both suits were instituted in "good faith." However, since subjective intent is difficult to ascertain, it might be preferable to require that a second suit could be instituted only after waiting a
"reasonable" period of time. Neither the good faith nor the reasonable time requirement would foreclose completely the possibility of
wasted administrative and judicial resources or harassing multiple
suits. Nevertheless, these two requirements together would probably
64. See FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964) (court unable to
find unreasonable delay where corporation failed to show time necessary to dispose of
similar agency proceedings or evidence of a dilatory attitude by the agency).
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eliminate many potential abuses. The courts' ability to control abuse
of the review opportunity could be further strengthened by expressly
granting courts the power to assess attorneys' fees against a party
committing such abuse.

B. Is the Delay Unreasonable?
The determination of whether the passage of time is "unreasonable" requires balancing at least two factors: the administrative justification for the delay and the harm to the party resulting from the
delay. I£ the harm to the party is substantial and the justification for
delay is weak, even a short delay might be intolerable. If the harm
to the party is de minimus and the justification for delay is strong,
even a substantial lapse of time might be permissible. If the harm to
the party and the administrative justification are both substantial,
or both minimal, then other policies may have to be considered to
make a rational determination of whether the delay is "unreasonable."
1. Cause of Delay: Administrative Justification

Time passes for many reasons, and a given instance of administrative delay may or may not be defensible. Some causes of delay
are inherently unjustifiable, such as discrimination or bias. Other
causes bear no reasonable relation to the effective functioning of the
administrative process, such as unnecessary or repetitive proceedings.
Still, administrative delay may be reasonable, as when its source lies
in the complexity of the issues to be resolved or in the time-consuming nature of the remedy. The court's function is to assess the administrative justification for the passage of time as it relates to the reasonable needs of the agency. The court may also ask whether the
cause of the delay, even if unjustified, can be alleviated by judicial
relief. Other institutions may be better equipped to provide a remedy-as, for example, when delay is caused by crowded dockets or
inadequate legislative appropriations.
A special problem arises when delay is caused in whole or in part
by the dilatory tactics of the party before the agency. In such circumstances, it can be argued that the party comes to court with "unclean hands" and should not be eligible for judicial relief. However,
the "unclean hands" notion should not foreclose relief in all circumstances. A court should evaluate how substantially the party has
contributed to the delay; if the party's degree of fault is insignificant
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and the agency's contribution to delay is considerable, then judicial
relief should not be precluded. Undoubtedly, there are many problems of proof when inquiry is directed to the question of which litigant has caused the delay. The court might require the party to prove
that his activity or behavior did not contribute substantially to the
delay. Alternatively, the agency could be allowed to assert party delay
as an affirmative defense. Since proof of party delay differs from proof
of agency delay in the respect that the necessary facts are not peculiarly within the knowledge of one litigant, considerations of fairness
and convenience do not compel either alternative. Therefore, the
burden of proof should be allocated to the party or to the agency on
the basis of an initial policy decision as to how easy it should be to
get relief from agency delay.
Irrespective of the cause of delay and of the related problems of
proof, judicial relief might be foreclosed if the party before the
agency waives his objection to the delay. 65 Yet the waiver notion has
its limits. A waiver should not readily be implied from party inaction,
since parties often will not know that the agency is taking an inordinately long time. Moreover, frequent application of the waiver doctrine would encourage unnecessary, repetitive, and time-consuming
party activity designed to negate the possibility of waiver. Finally,
in instances of gross agency delay other policies might justify judicial
intervention despite an express waiver.
2. Harm to the Party

In addition to assessing the administrative justification for delay,
a court must assay the nature and magnitude of the harm that the
delay has inflicted upon the party before the agency. In making such
an appraisal, the initial question is whether "irreparable harm" is a
necessary prerequisite to invoking judicial relief.
Despite traditional theory, a showing of something less than irreparable harm may constitute adequate grounds for judicial relief in
situations where there is no administrative justification for delay, or
where a court perceives a need to police the administrative process. If,
.£or example, delay results from unnecessary or repetitive proceedings, a court may relax the irrreparable harm standard. Not only is
such wasted administrative action unjustified, but also the strong
independent policy of optimum allocation of administrative re65. There appear to be no cases on waiver of a delay objection; however, American
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951), seems to imply that tbe waiver
notion is applicable.
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sources argues in favor of intervention. Likewise, pecuniary harmwhether irreparable or not-seems irrelevant when delay results from
discrimination or bias. In such situations, complementary policies of
equal protection and impartiality compel judicial intervention.
In those instances, however, where there are either some administrative justifications for delay or no other policies independently
favoring judical relief, a showing of irreparable injury should be
necessary. And, if adequate and nonburdensome alternative remedies
can serve to insulate the party from the harmful effects of the delay,
judicial relief should not be available. In the case of a rate-making
proceeding, for example, judicial relief from delay should be precluded if the applicant desiring higher rates were given the alternative of increasing its rate structure while placing the extra funds in
escrow pending the outcome of the rate-making proceeding. But, as
the burden of recovering losses from administrative delay increases, a
court is faced with the necessity of deciding at what point the harm
becomes irreparable. For example, is the harm irreparable when delay results in higher construction costs for a new facility? Although
these costs eventually can be recovered through increased rates, recovery will be achieved over a long period of time and at an added
cost to consumers.
Whether or not irreparable harm is always a required condition
for court intervention, it is not necessarily a sufficient ground for
judicial relief. This principle is illustrated in cases like hypothetical
case I, where the most appropriate judical remedy would be acceleration of the agency proceedings. Assuming a limited supply of administrative resources, acceleration might require the agency to alter its
priority of cases. In this situation, a showing of irreparable harm may
not be enough; the court might also require proof that the altered
agency calendar would not impose an undue burden on other parties
before the agency. Developing this kind of proof may be both timeconsuming and difficult, and would involve the court in the judicially unmanageable task of balancing largely immeasurable factors.
When these problems appear, the court might instead require the
party seeking judicial relief to show that the harm it has suffered
quantitatively outweighs the harm which judicial relief would cause
to other parties before the agency. This objective test would simplify
the judicial inquiry substantially. Yet, quite apart from the problem
of how the court could evolve a meaningful standard to decide what
the threshold level of harm ought to be, a rigid application of such a
"quantitative substantiality" test might limit judicial relief from
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administrative delay to larger applicants, since smaller parties would
be less easily able to make the required threshold showing of harm.
Nevertheless, there will still be instances in which the burden to
other parties before the agency will be immeasurable. In those cases
courts may be compelled to make an essentially arbitrary, intuitive
judgment about comparative harm.

C. Competing Policies
Even if a party shows the requisite harm to himself, absence of
potential harm to other parties, and a lack of administrative justification for delay, other competing policies may still prohibit judicial
relief. These countervailing considerations frequently arise in suits
to review or enforce NLRB back pay orders66 when employers contend that agency delay in issuing the order substantially increased
their liability and prevented them from mitigating damages. Employers have been unsuccessful in this contention, despite a showing
of the requisite irreparable harm and lack of administrative justification for the delay. Although the employer has an interest in a rapid
determination of his liability, this interest can be vindicated only at
the expense of imposing the burden of delay upon the workers
against whom the employer discriminated. Even the entire back pay
award is a wholly unsatisfactory remedy to these people; to reduce
this award still further because of administrative delay would be
harsh and unfair.
Other policies, aside from the equities asserted by other interested
parties, may preclude judicial relief. In cases where an agency brings
suit to obtain enforcement of a binding order, for example, 67 the
lapse of time between the agency's issuance of the order and initiation of the court action should not be grounds either for denying
enforcement or for granting the defendant leave to adduce additional
evidence of interim compliance. Granting relief for delay in this
situation would encourage deliberate violation of administrative
regulations and subvert the policy favoring promptness in seeking
court review.
Thus, although the party before the agency may have an interest
66. See, e.g., NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685 (1942); NLRB v.
Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. American Creosoting Co.,
139 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n of Central
Calif., 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Wilson Line, Inc., 122 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.
1941).
67. See NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland
Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); NLRB v. Eanet, 179 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1949); NLRB v.
Aluminum Prods. Co., 120 F.2d 567,573 (7th Cir. 1941).
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in the rapid determination of his rights or liabilities, this interest
may be subordinated to other interests or policies in appropriate circumstances. And conversely, if the party before the agency establishes
the requisite harm from unjustified administrative delay, then, in
the absence of other overriding interests or policies, the party seems
entitled to a judicial remedy.
VI.

REMEDIES

There are many remedies to combat protracted administrative
delay in the judicial arsenal. When the suit is brought before agency
action is initiated, the remedy may be an order compelling the agency
to assume jurisdiction68 over the case or to refuse jurisdiction.69 If
suit is instituted after agency action is complete, the appropriate relief may take the form of an order to set aside70 or modify71 the original order, or to suspend,72 equalize,73 or deny74 enforcement of that
order. And when suit is instituted prior to the completion of the
administrative process, there are at least three remedies available.
The first of these is judicial acceleration, which can be achieved by
enjoining agency activity that is purposeless, unduly oppressive, or
repetitive, 75 by a remand to the agency with directions to proceed
with all deliberate speed,76 or by mandamus requiring the agency to
approve party action or show cause why no approval should be forthcoming.77 A second possibility is judicial pre-emption of the power
to decide the substantive issues.78 This remedy, since it precludes the
agency from making the initial determination pursuant to its statutory mandate, should be employed sparingly, if at all.
The third means of disposition is judicial termination of agency
proceedings. In United States v. One Book Entitled "The Adventures
of Father Silas/' 79 for example, protracted delay between the time
68. Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520 (1947).
69. Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946).
70. NLRB v. American Creosoting Co., 139 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1943).
71. NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685 (1942).
72. C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom. Moog
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
73. Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953).
74. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965).
75. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
76. American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
77. Application of Trico Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 92 Ariz. 373, 377 P.2d 309 (1962).
78. See, e.g., Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (agency delayed in processing an application for second-class mailing privileges;
court ordered the application granted); Southeastern Oil Florida v. United States, 115
F. Supp. 198 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (agency delayed in processing a claim for payment; court
decided that plaintiff was entitled to recover).
79. 249 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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that allegedly obscene books were seized by the Collector of Customs
and the time that an action to confiscate the books was instituted
served as grounds for invalidating the seizure. The remedy granted
for this unlawful delay was release of the books, whether or not obscene, to the claimant. This kind of remedy will effectively deter
administrative laxity and does not appear overly harsh, particularly
when the delay impinges upon the constitutionally protected interest
in a rapid determination of the obscenity issue. Moreover, the public
interest in preventing obscene literature from circulating ·will not
be seriously jeopardized by the isolated use of such a remedy because
of the minimal number of books which will be released. On the other
hand, dismissal in disciplinary cases seems inappropriate when the
party's interest in speedy adjudication is clearly subordinate to the
public interest in effectuating administrative policy. so Moreover,
it is arguable that the agency, rather than the court, is a more appropriate body to decide whether dismissal would endanger the administrative regulatory scheme and be contrary to the public interest.
A somewhat related problem is whether a party to an administrative proceeding is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice. The
limitations upon the power of an agency to terminate proceedings
arbitrarily without disposing of the case were involved in Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 81 where the court
refused to let the agency terminate a rate proceeding prior to reaching a final decision. Despite the fact that the agency had complete
discretion in instituting such proceedings, the court concluded that
the party before the agency could-after completing lengthy and
costly hearings which were arbitrarily discontinued without reaching a final decision-go to court to compel the agency to enter a final
decision.
In choosing between judicial acceleration, judicial pre-emption,
or judicial termination, a court should select that form of relief which
has the least adverse effect on the proper functioning of the administrative process. In most cases, this consideration would indicate the
choice of judicial acceleration. But if the only appropriate remedy
will have some undesirable affect on the administrative process, then
this effect must be balanced together with the harm to the party and
the administrative justification for the delay in deciding whether
relief should be granted at all. If there is no appropriate remedy, it
may be that we have come full circle-that is, it may be that the
particular delay issue is not justiciable in the first place.
80. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
81. 294 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

